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The Court of Disbelief:
The Constitution's Article VI Religious Test
Prohibition and the Judiciary's Religious
Motive Analysis*
by FRANCIS J. BECKWITH+
Introduction'
In several federal cases concerning whether particular statutes or
policies violate the First Amendment's prohibition of religious estab-
lishment, both the United States Supreme Court and other federal
courts have rejected the constitutionality of these laws and policies on
the grounds that they have an exclusively religious purpose. Part of
the courts' analyses in some of these cases rely on the apparent reli-
gious motives of the statute's or policy's sponsors and/or citizen-
supporters as the basis by which the courts infer that the law or policy
in question has a religious purpose.
I argue in this paper that this sort of analysis may violate the no
Religious Test Clause section of Article VI of the U. S. Constitution
as well as the prohibition of punishing or rewarding citizens based on
their beliefs. I also argue that the judiciary's failure to appreciate
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 101" annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Political Science Association (1-4 September 2005), Washington, D.C.
'Associate Director of the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Associate Pro-
fessor of Church-State Studies, and Fellow and Faculty Affiliate at the Cetner fo Religious
Inquire Across the Disciplines (CRIAD), Baylor University. Ph.D. (philosophy), M.A.
(philosophy), Fordham University; M.J.S. (Master of Juridical Studies), Washington Uni-
versity School of Law, St. Louis.
1. Special thanks to Casey Luskin and Barry Hankins for reading an earlier draft of
this paper and offering the author important suggestions, some of which he included in
this version. Nevertheless, any flaws in this paper are entirely the author's.
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these possible violations is the result of embracing a mode of analysis,
when applied to the origin and purpose of statutes and policies, that is
based on a conflation of the terms "motive" and "purpose" as well as
a mistake in thinking that the reasons employed to justify laws and
policies are the same as the beliefs that motivate the persons who
support them. And because of these confusions, the judiciary in effect
limits the enumerated powers of legislators and provides a perverse
incentive for both citizens and legislators to pretend that their mo-
tives are not religious in order to convince a skeptical judiciary that
the laws and policies they support have secular purposes. Learning
from the judiciary's example, activists now draw pejorative attention
to the apparent religious motives of citizens and legislators in order to
shore up popular support against, and influence future cases on, legis-
lation they think violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.2
In order to make my case, I present an analysis of (I) the No Re-
ligious Test Clause and the First Amendment, (II) the difference be-
tween motive and purpose, and (III) the distinction between belief
and action. I then (IV) review two cases in which federal courts em-
ploy a religious motive analysis. I conclude that this mode of analysis
targets beliefs and thus violates Article VI when applied to lawmak-
ers and is an illegitimate assessment of belief when applied to either
legislators or ordinary citizens.
The No Religious Test Clause and The First Amendment
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states that "no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States."3 According to Daniel Dreisbach, this "pro-
vision generated energetic debate in the state ratifying conventions."'
2. For example, Barbara Forrest writes: "At heart, proponents of intelligent design
are not motivated to improve science but to transform it into a theistic enterprise that
supports religious faith." Barbara Forrest, The Newest Evolution of Creationism: Intelli-
gent Design is About Politics and Religion, Not Science, in 111.3 NATURAL HISTORY 80
(Apr. 2002). Joined by two co-authors, Professor Forrest has also offered a lengthy legal
assessment of the teaching of intelligent design (ID) in public schools in which she stresses
the "religious motives" of many ID supporters as dispositive for rejecting the teaching of
ID in public schools as constitutionally permissible. See Steven G. Gey, Matthew J.
Brauer, and Barbara Forrest, Is it Science Yet?: Intelligent Design Creationism and the
Constitution 79-93 (September 2004), FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper
No. 125, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=590882.
3. U. S. CONST., art. VI.
4. Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of
Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Relig-
For it was widely believed at the time of the American Founding that
certain religious traditions and systems of belief in comparison to
others were more conducive to protecting and sustaining republican
government and civil society Dreisbach quotes Luther Martin in this
regard: "[I]t should be at least decent to hold out some distinction be-
tween Christianity and downright infidelity or paganism. '' 6 However,
supporters of Article VI's religious test ban, notes Dreisbach,
"framed the debate in terms of religious liberty."7 Take for example
the defense offered by a Connecticut delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, Oliver Ellsworth:
My countrymen, the sole purpose and effect of it [i.e., Arti-
cle VI] is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you the
important right of religious liberty .... In our country every
man has a right to worship God in that way which is most
agreeable to his conscience. If he be a good and peaceable
person[,] he is liable to no penalties or incapacities on ac-
count of his religious sentiments; or in other words, he is not
subject to persecution.8
As Dreisbach notes, the federal ban on religious tests was not the
result of a consensus of delegates rejecting such bans in principle. For
religious tests and/or oaths were found in almost all state constitu-
tions during the time of the Revolutionary War, and some of these
state tests and oaths were fashioned and championed by some of the
delegates at the Constitutional Convention who supported a federal
ion in the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 949 (Fall 1996).
5. As Philip Hamburger points out when explaining the reaction of the Danbury
Baptists to the Letter sent to them by then-President Thomas Jefferson (See infra, II, III),
"[I]t may be useful to begin by considering the [Baptists'] awkward situation....
[E]stablishment ministers [i.e., those ministers supported state religious establishments]
had long accused dissenters of advocating separation, whether of church from state or reli-
gious from government.... Of course, Baptists merely sought disestablishment and did
not challenge the widespread assumption that republican government depended upon the
people's morals and thus upon religion." PHILLIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH & STATE 165 (2002).
6. Dreisbach, supra note 4, at 950 (citing 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 385-86 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 1859)) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates].
7. Dreisbach, supra note 4, at 950.
8. Oliver Ellsworth, The Landholder, VII, CONN. COURANT, Dec. 17, 1787, re-
printed in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING
ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788 167-68 (Paul L. Ford & Burt Franklin,
eds.,1970), as quoted in Dreisbach, supra note 4, at 950.
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prohibition of religious tests and oaths.9 This suggests that federalism
concerns, and the specific concern that state religious tests and oaths
not be superceded by national tests, were factors in the passage of the
federal ban.'° The common understanding at the time did not main-
tain that religious liberty and religious disestablishment were incon-
sistent with state religious tests and oaths for public office, since it
was widely believed, as I noted above, that the role of a public official
required a certain moral character that could best (or only) be sus-
tained in a citizen who had been inculcated with certain religious be-
liefs.' Nevertheless, given the historical milieu in which the Constitu-
tion's drafters found themselves, the radical and groundbreaking
nature of Article VI cannot be overstated, even though it seems mod-
est by today's standards. For it "was a bold and significant and depar-
ture from the prevailing practices in Europe, as well as most of the
states."'2 Dreisbach goes on to explain:
Religious tests had long been a favored instrument for
preserving the political power of established churches
and denying equal political opportunity to adherents
of other creeds. The test ban was not strictly a "dises-
tablishment" measure since there was no formal estab-
lishment to abolish. However, the test ban preempted
the prospect of a national ecclesiastical establishment
by removing a useful mechanism for a religious de-
9. Dreisbach, supra note 4, at 950.
10. Id. at 950-951. Judge Michael McConnell writes:
At the federal level, restrictions of this sort were barred by Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that "no religious Test shall ever be required as
a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." This is
the only explicit "religious liberty" provision of the original Constitution. It
proved, however, to be one of the more controversial features of the docu-
ment. Many Americans considered it too risky a proposition to allow Catho-
lics or non-Christians to hold office. What if they introduced the Inquisition?
The provision ultimately proved acceptable less because of opposition to test
oaths than to concerns that test oaths at the federal level might reflect the
views of some other religious faction than one's own. As with so many mat-
ters, federalism offered a solution to otherwise deeply divisive problems.
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part k Estab-
lishment of Religion 44 WM AND MARY L. REV. 2105, 2178-79 (April 2003) (notes omit-
ted).
11. Dreisbach, supra note 4, at 950-51. See also, Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious
Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself,
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 681-87 (1987).
12. Dreisbach, supra note 4, at 951.
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nomination to exert control over the political proc-
esses. Moreover, the ban opened the door for mem-
bers of minority sects to become full and equal partici-
pants in the democratic enterprise. The ban was thus
calculated to secure religious liberty, deter religious
persecution, ensure sect equality before the law, and
promote independence of the federal government
from ecclesiastical domination and interference.13
Despite the historical significance of the inclusion of Article VI
in the Constitution of the early republic, the text of the religious test
ban has become more or less a dead letter since the Supreme Court
has found that the prohibition of religious tests and oaths in the Free
Exercise and/or Establishment Clauses apply to the states by incorpo-
ration of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 4 For instance, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the Supreme Court de-
clared as unconstitutional a Maryland law that required a declaration
of belief in God's existence as a condition for holding public office. 5
Justice Hugo Black wrote in the Court's unanimous opinion:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the
Federal Government can constitutionally force a person to
"profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." ... This Mary-
land religious test for public office unconstitutionally in-
vades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and
13. Id.
14. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155 n.1 (2d ed.
1988); ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 971-72
(1997). The Court first incorporated the freedom of speech and press clauses, eventually
incorporating the entire First Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (freedom of speech and press "are among the fundamental personal rights and 'lib-
erties' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impair-
ment by the states"); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ("It is no longer
open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action");
De Jorge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) ("The right of peaceable assembly is a right
cognate to those of free speech and free press as fundamental"); Cantwell v. Connecticut
310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940) ("The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered legislatures of the States as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws"); and Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)
(noting the Establishment Clause applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
15. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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therefore cannot be enforced against him.
16
Although he leaves out any such citation, Justice Black in this
passage seems to be relying on an interpretation of the First Amend-
ment he first offered over a decade earlier in Everson v. Board of
Education,7 in which he states: "No person can be punished for enter-
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs...." Four years
earlier, Justice Robert Jackson, seeming to rely on the same rationale,
writes in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette:'8 "If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein." The principle that seems to ground
this rationale has its origin in what was once called "freedom of con-
science": no citizen's religious beliefs may be employed by the gov-
ernment to disqualify that citizen from either public office in particular
or political participation in general.'9
16. Id. at 495.
17. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
19. Although a minority view at the time of the American Founding, Thomas Jeffer-
son articulates it well in his Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom:
That our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more
than our opinions in physics or geometry; that, therefore, the proscribing of
any citizen as unworthy of the public confidence by laying upon him an inca-
pacity of being called to offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or
renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those
privileges and advantages to which in common with his fellow-citizens he has
a natural right.
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL,
ET. AL., RELIGION & THE CONSTITUTION 70 (2002), quoted in McConnell, supra note 10,
at 2179.
James Madison's defense of freedom of conscience is more explicit than Jefferson's. Madi-
son writes:
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that Religion or
the duty which we owe to our Creator and the [Manner of discharging it, can
be directed only by reason and] conviction, not by force or violence." The Re-
ligion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.
This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable; because the
opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own
minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also; because
what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty
of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he be-
lieves to be acceptable to him.... We maintain therefore that in matters of
Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and
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So, what was first a constitutional prohibition of religious tests
and oaths for only federal offices-partly motivated by both sustain-
ing federalism and protecting local religious tests and oaths from fed-
eral supercession-eventually was extended to all public offices in
every jurisdiction of the United States. It is no exaggeration to say
that the ban on religious tests and oaths for public office is now a
fixed principle of America's constitutional framework, and, as I argue
below, that principle is no less violated when a legislator's powers are
obstructed by a religious test after he or she enters public office than
it is when he or she is excluded on religious grounds from holding
public office altogether. It seems clear as well that this principle has
been extended, through the contemporary interpretation of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, to prohibiting the government
from punishing or rewarding citizens for "entertaining or professing
beliefs or disbeliefs." 20
The Distinction Between Belief and Action: Freedom of Belief
as an Ultima Facie Right
The Supreme Court has, in several opinions, concluded that
holding a religious belief is an ultima facie right. Unlike prima facie
fundamental rights-e.g., freedom of speech, free exercise of relig-
ion-that may be trumped by the government's compelling state in-
terest, religious beliefs as such may never be proscribed or serve as
the basis of punishment or reward by the government." This seems to
that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance....
.... Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.
We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and one of [the]
noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of America did
not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled
the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle,
and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. We reverse this
lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may es-
tablish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all
other Sects?
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in
THE COMPLETE MADISON 299-301 (S. Padover ed., 1953), quoted in Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 53 n.38 (1985).
20. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (1947).
21. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993):
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their reli-
Winter & Spring 20061
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be what Thomas Jefferson had in mind when he told the Danbury
Baptists in his famous letter to them "that the legitimate powers of
government reach actions only, & not opinions." 22
In McDaniel v. Paty, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he Free
Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating,
prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such. '' The Court relied
on a notion it clearly articulated fifteen years earlier in Sherbert v.
Verner:
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed
against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as
such. Government may neither compel affirmation of a re-
pugnant belief, nor penalize or discriminate against indi-
viduals or groups because they hold religious views abhor-
rent to the authorities, nor employ the taxing power to
inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views. On
the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the
Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain
overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for
"even when the action is in accord with one's religious con-
victions, (it) is not totally free from legislative restrictions."
The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed
some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.'
The jurisprudential paternity of these holdings can be found in
the Jefferson-influenced Reynolds v. United States: "Laws are made
for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices." 25
Clearly, the judiciary and other branches of government are not re-
stricted from assessing the actions of the country's constituent gov-
gious motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is justified by
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that inter-
est.(citations omitted)(emphasis added).
22. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), in 57 THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS INFORMATION BULLETIN 6 (June 1998), available at
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
23. 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963))
(emphasis added).
24. 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)).
25. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
ernments and their citizens, 26 and the reasons offered by these gov-
ernments and citizens to support these actions.27 But the beliefs of
both citizens and lawmakers are not legitimate objects of assessment
by the state, including by its courts.28
The Court, at least on one occasion, has expressed skepticism in
being able to clearly demarcate between beliefs and actions. In Wis-
consin v. Yoder, the Court claimed that the case "does not become
easier because respondents were convicted for their 'actions' in refus-
ing to send their children to the public high school; in this context be-
lief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compart-
ments., 29 Nevertheless, I am not convinced that the distinction
between belief and practice-as articulated by Jefferson and in Rey-
nolds-was rejected in Yoder. In Yoder, the Court assessed the ques-
tion of whether Wisconsin's refusal to exempt Amish children from
the state's compulsory education requirement could be upheld be-
cause the law only touched the actions and not the beliefs of the
Amish. But, as the Court points out, the education of the Amish
community's children is one of those cases in which belief and action
are tightly intertwined, since the community's view of education is in-
exorably connected to Amish theology's views on humanity, the so-
cial order, knowledge, and the good life." Nevertheless, the Court did
not reject the Jeffersonian principle-affirmed in Reynolds, McDan-
iel, and Sherbert-that mere belief ("belief as such," as the Court calls
it) could not be the object of state interference, which is essential to
the case I am making in this paper. After all, if the state of Wisconsin
26. Consider, for example, the Court's consideration, in light of the First Amend-
ment, of the actions of teacher-led, government-authorized, school-prayer, see Engel v.
Vitale 370 U. S. 421, 424-25 (1962), and a university's refusal to fund printing costs for a
religious publication (similarly situated to school-funded secular publications), see Rosen-
berger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823-27 (1995).
27. Consider, for example, the reasons offered by the state to justify teacher-led, gov-
ernment-authored, school prayer, see Engel, 370 U. S. at 430-31, and a by a university for
its refusal to fund the printing costs of a religious publication that was similarly situated to
school-funded secular publications, see Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31. In both cases, the
Court assessed the reasons offered by the state and ruled that they were inadequate to jus-
tify the policies under the principles of the First Amendment.
28. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179-180 (1803). The Supreme Court stated
that the judiciary is not exempt from being prohibited from employing "a law repugnant to
the Constitution." See id. at 180 ("Thus, the particular phraseology of the [C]onstitution of
the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the [C]onstitution is void; and that courts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.").
29. 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
30. Id. at 209-19.
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had targeted the Amish's religious beliefs as such, rather than the
community's refusal to conform to the state's compulsory education
policy, the state would have probably lost on summary judgment in
the trial court.
Motives as Beliefs
So far, I have shown that two points of American constitutional
law are well-established: (1) a religious test or oath for office (and by
extension, a religious test for the rights and powers of citizenship in
general) is forbidden by the Constitution; (2) the government, includ-
ing the judiciary, is categorically forbidden from limiting a citizen's
political rights on the basis of her religious beliefs.
In this section, I argue that motives are types of beliefs. This is
important for the case I am making, because I want to argue that the
judiciary's religious motive analysis runs afoul of the two well-
established constitutional principles defended above. In order to
make this case, I offer two points: (A) I argue that purposes and mo-
tives are conceptually distinct. (This is because, as discussed in infra
IV, the judiciary oftentimes confuses the purpose of a piece of legisla-
tion with the motive of the legislator who supports it); (B) I then ex-
plain why motives are types of beliefs.
A. Purposes and Motives Are Conceptually Distinct
Consider a modest example derived from a familiar case. Imag-
ine that it is 1802, you are a leader in the Danbury Baptist Church of
Connecticut, and you are not pleased that your state has levied a tax
to support its established church, Congregationalism. Although Con-
necticut does allow Baptists and other citizens to request that the
state redirect their tax money to their own churches, the process re-
quires that "they first... obtain, fill out, and properly file an exemp-
tion certificate."'" And because "Baptists [are] a harassed minority,
some communities [make] it difficult for them to receive these ex-
emptions,"32 which is why you and your fellow Baptists share your
complaint with President Thomas Jefferson. The President replies in
what has become a famous letter. In that reply, Jefferson writes that
he agrees "with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or
31. Derek H. Davis, Thomas Jefferson and the "Wall Of Separation" Metaphor, 45 J.
CHURCH & STATE 5, 10 (Winter 2003).
32. Id.
his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions
only, & not opinions."33 Jefferson goes on to announce his reverence
for the American people's embrace of that portion of the First
Amendment that declares that Congress "should 'make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.
3 4
Suppose that you agree with the President's sentiments and wish
that your state, Connecticut, would include religion clauses in its con-
stitution similar to those found in the Federal Constitution and ex-
tolled by the President in his reply. So, in principle you support reli-
gious free exercise for all faiths including your own. You see,
correctly, that the purpose of such a constitutional amendment would
be to increase religious liberty for all by forbidding the state to estab-
lish a religion and support it financially by taxing those of contrary
faiths. However, your motive for advancing this constitutional
amendment is so that the state may relieve your religion of a financial
burden that is inhibiting evangelism. That is to say, your motive for
supporting this constitutional amendment is religious: you believe
that it is a good thing for people to convert to the Baptist faith and
the current legal arrangement in your state makes such conversions
more difficult. But that is not a complete account of your motive. It
also has a state-restricting aspect to it. For you have no intention in
establishing the Baptist faith as the state's official religion, even if you
had the opportunity and power to do so, because you sincerely hold
to the theological belief that faith resulting from coercion, however
minimal, is not authentic faith. So, your motive for supporting a state
constitutional amendment that protects religious liberty and forbids
religious establishment is unequivocally to advance a particular un-
derstanding of religious truth. Nevertheless, the purpose of the pro-
posed amendment is consistent with a liberal view of religious free-
dom and anti-establishment, which, by any account, is secular. So, we
have a case in which a particular law's purpose is secular while the
motive of its supporter is purely religious. And yet, it seems odd to
say that this law, because of the motive of its supporter, would violate
religious establishment. After all, the law, motivated by religious be-
liefs, forbids religious establishment.
Now imagine that you are a resident of Virginia, and you, with
the help of the President, convince your fellow citizens that the state
33. Id.
34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS INFORMATION BULLETIN, supra note 24.
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should place in its constitution an amendment that consists of reli-
gious liberty and anti-establishment clauses identical to the amend-
ment proposed in Connecticut. Suppose, however, that your motive
for proposing this amendment is not religious at all. Rather, your be-
liefs in religious liberty and anti-establishment are motivated by the
belief that a good community is one that ought to rid itself of any ves-
tiges of a bygone era in which citizens persecuted each other for po-
litical power so that the state may endorse, establish, and support a
particular ecclesiastical body. Although the purpose and wording of
the amendment offered in Virginia is identical to the one the Baptists
are suggesting for Connecticut, the first is motivated by what most
people would consider non-religious beliefs while the second is relig-
iously motivated. Yet, the motive of the supporters of each adds noth-
ing to the content and purpose of the amendment. In conclusion, a
law's purpose and a legislator's (or citizen's) motive are conceptually
distinct.
B. Motives Are Types of Beliefs
A motive is a type of belief that is causally effective in contribut-
ing to the bringing about of an action by an agent (i.e., a citizen). A
motive, of course, is not a sufficient condition to bring about an action
by an agent, since an agent may have a number of beliefs that, though
potentially causally effective, never contribute to bringing about an
action for a variety of reasons including the absence of other condi-
tions such as the agent's failure to exercise the power to act. For ex-
ample, if I am a citizen with libertarian philosophical beliefs, I would
be motivated to support legislation that would eradicate the public
school system if such legislation were proposed by the lawmakers in
my state. But because no such legislation has been proposed-that is,
a condition for my acting is absent-my motive is merely a potentially
causally effective contributory condition for me to bring about an ac-
tion, namely, to offer financial and political support for the legisla-
tion.
A motive, however, is not the act or policy itself, and neither is
the motive the reason that justifies the particular policy or action. At
best, a motive may explain why an agent supports a particular policy,
but an explanation is neither the policy itself nor the justification for
the policy. For example, one's belief in God may be explained by
one's belief that one ought to follow the religious tradition of one's
family, but the belief itself-"God exists"-and the justification for
that belief-e.g., the cosmological argument, one's personal encoun-
ter with God-are separate matters altogether and should be assessed
as such. To discount the veracity of belief, on the grounds that one
may offer another belief, a motive, as a causally contributory condi-
tion that helps account for how belief, arose in the believer's noetic
structure is to commit the genetic fallacy.35
Consider the role of motives on questions of public policy and
law and their relation to the policy or law in question and the reasons
for it. Two people, for instance, can have the exact same motive for
two contrary policies or acts, e.g., Bob opposes, and Fred supports,
welfare reform because each is motivated by a desire to help the
poor. Moreover, one policy or act may be supported by citizens with
contrary motives, e.g., Bob opposes welfare reform because he is mo-
tivated to help the poor; Tom opposes welfare reform because he is
motivated to get reelected and most of his constituents oppose wel-
fare reform. In addition, one policy or act may be supported by two
citizens with the same motive but each justifies the policy or act for
different reasons, e.g., Bob and Sid both oppose welfare reform be-
cause each is motivated to help the poor, but Bob justifies the policy
by showing that a similar policy in California failed whereas Sid justi-
fies the policy by appealing to what he thinks are sound principles of
social justice. A motive in many ways is a belief properly basic to
one's personal constitution, character, and inner life and cannot be
"unbelieved" by an act of will in the way that one may willingly and
without much difficulty offer different reasons or purposes for the
same policies and acts one may advance throughout one's life.
Within constitutional law, these distinctions are important. Let
me reiterate some points raised earlier. The Supreme Court holds
that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government
from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such...
,36 This is because the Court makes a distinction between belief and
practice: "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they
may with practices."37 Although the government (including the judici-
ary) may assess its own actions and those of its citizens, as well as the
reasons for those actions, it follows that it may not assess religious
motives if motives are beliefs.
35. The genetic fallacy occurs when the origin of a viewpoint or argument, rather than
its merits, is employed to dismiss it out of hand. Although the origin of an idea may play a
part in assessing its merits, the genetic fallacy is committed when the idea is dismissed
based on its origin even though the origin of the idea is not a necessary condition for the
soundness of the arguments for it.
36. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (emphasis added); see supra, note 26.
37. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,166 (1878).
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Religious Motive Analysis
In this section I critically examine two federal court cases in
which government acts were declared unconstitutional because of the
motivation of its legislative and/or citizen supporters. In my assess-
ment of these two cases I hope to show that the religious motive
analysis violates the constitutional principles presented above.
Selman v. Cobb County School District38
In March 2002, the school board of Cobb County, Ga., ordered
that a cautionary sticker be placed on science textbooks covering the
topic of evolution. The sticker states: "This textbook contains mate-
rial on evolution. Evolution is a theory, not a fact, regarding the ori-
gin of living things. This material should be approached with an open
mind, studied carefully and critically considered."39
A group of parents whose children attend Cobb County schools
went to court to challenge the constitutionality of this warning.4° On
January 13, 2005, U.S. District Judge Clarence Cooper agreed that
the sticker violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. While the Cobb County sticker has its problems,41 what is far
more troubling is the court's analysis.
Judge Cooper begins his opinion with some important clarifica-
tions. He points out that the court's opinion deals with a narrow ques-
tion-the constitutionality of the sticker's content-and does not ad-
dress the many other issues that animate the differing factions in this
debate. For Judge Cooper, this case is not about the relationship be-
tween science and religion or even the proper classification of evolu-
tion as a theory or a fact.42 He then applies to the narrow question the
three-prong test laid out by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; sec-
ond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
38. 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (2005).
39. Id. at 1292.
40. Id. at 1286-87.
41. There are at least two problems with this sticker. First, calling evolution a theory
"regarding the origin of living things" may be misleading if one is talking about biological
evolution, which concerns how living things that already exist change over time. Second,
the claim that evolution is "not a fact" is inconsistent with the school board's call for criti-
cal thinking. The board cannot say that evolution is not a fact and at the same time sug-
gest to students that they should have an open mind on the subject, since having an open
mind requires that they critically consider the possibility that evolution is a fact.
42. See generally Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d. at 1297-98.
government entanglement with religion.' ', 3 A statute or policy that
fails any one of these prongs violates the Establishment Clause.
The Cobb County sticker passes the first prong because it has
two secular purposes, writes the judge. First, the sticker "fosters criti-
cal thinking by encouraging students to learn about evolution to make
their own assessment regarding [the evolution theory's] merit." 4 Sec-
ond, the sticker is an attempt to present evolution "in a manner that is
not unnecessarily hostile" in order to "reduce offense to students and
parents whose beliefs may conflict with the teaching of evolution.",
41
In determining whether the sticker passes Lemon's second prong
(the "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion"), Cooper conscripts the rationale behind the
Supreme Court's endorsement test:46 If a statute or policy creates a
perception that the state is either endorsing or disfavoring a religion,
the action is unconstitutional. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor notes
in Lynch v. Donnelly, the concern here is whether the disputed law or
policy sends "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the po-
litical community.",47 In Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O'Connor argues
that a statute violates the establishment clause if an objective ob-
server fully informed of all the facts "would perceive it as a state en-
dorsement" of religion.'
Judge Cooper concludes that the sticker fails this test, though
this judgment is not based on the "views or reactions held by the
Plaintiffs or the numerous citizens and organizations who wrote to the
Board., 49 Rather, it is based on "the view of a disinterested, reason-
able observer."5 ° Such a person, fully conversant with the history of
opposition to Darwin's idea, would recognize that the assertion "evo-
lution is a theory, not a fact" has its origin in anti-evolution literature
published by creationists.5 Thus, an informed, reasonable observer
43. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (striking down as unconstitutional statutes in Pennsyl-
vania and Rhode Island that involved public aid programs to private school teachers, some
of whom were parochial school teachers); see Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d.at 1298-1301.
44. Id. at 1305.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1305-10.
47. 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
48. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 62. Creationism, as understood by American courts and popular culture, is
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would view the sticker as endorsing a particular view of evolution es-
poused by the religiously motivated citizens and public officials of
Cobb County. This, according to Judge Cooper, tells citizens who are
staunch supporters of "evolution that they are political outsiders." 
5 2
This analysis fails for several reasons. First, it seems inconsistent
with the analysis under Lemon's first prong, which affirms that one of
the sticker's secular purposes is to reduce offense to religious citizens.
In other words, religious citizens stated, through their government
representatives, a goal of attempting to reduce hostility to certain re-
ligious beliefs, and the court acknowledges that such a goal consti-
tutes a secular purpose that passes Lemon's first prong. Yet somehow
the policy does not survive under Lemon's second prong for precisely
the same reason that the court had just approved it under the first
prong.
Second, this reasoning presents a Catch-22 that makes it nearly
impossible for religious citizens to remedy public policies that they
believe are uniquely hostile to their beliefs. For who but the citizens
who take religious offense would be the most vocal critics of such
policies and the most visible proponents of ways to mitigate them?
Consequently, it is difficult to believe that the judge is suggesting that
synonymous with young-earth creationism. This view, according to Phillip E. Johnson (who
is not a young-earth creationist), is associated with the "term 'creation-science,' as used in
the Louisiana law [that required 'balanced treatment' between evolution and creationism,
and struck down in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)], [and] is commonly under-
stood to refer to a movement of Christian fundamentalists based upon an extremely literal
interpretation of the Bible." Writes Johnson:
Creation-scientists do not merely insist that life was created; they insist that
the job was completed in six days no more than ten thousand years ago, and
that all evolution since that time has involved trivial modifications rather than
basic changes.... [Young-earth creationism] attributes the existence of fossils
to Noah's flood.
PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL 4 (1991).
52. Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. Writes Judge Cooper:
In this case, the Court believes that an informed, reasonable observer would
interpret the Sticker to convey a message of endorsement of religion. That is,
the Sticker sends a message to those who oppose evolution for religious rea-
sons that they are favored members of the political community, while the
Sticker sends a message to those who believe in evolution that they are politi-
cal outsiders.... Further, the informed, reasonable observer would be aware
that citizens and parents largely motivated by religion put pressure on the
School Board to implement certain measures that would nevertheless dilute
the teaching of evolution, including placing a disclaimer in the front of certain
textbooks that distinguished evolution as a theory, not a fact. Finally, the in-
formed, reasonable observer would be aware that the language of the Sticker
essentially mirrors the viewpoint of these religiously-motivated citizens.
Id. at 1306-07.
citizens who desire to remedy a religious offense in their public school
curricula cannot themselves lobby their government. Yet if political
representatives respond to their concerns (just as elected officials
might respond to citizens objecting to school policies for non-religious
reasons or even to citizens calling for the teaching of evolution), such
a response would, under Judge Cooper's reasoning, raise Establish-
ment Clause concerns. The result is to impose a special burden on the
political activity of religious citizens, a burden not placed on secular
political participation.
Third, what makes this opinion particularly strange is not that
Judge Cooper is relying on the actual motives of religious citizens to
dismiss the textbook disclaimer as unconstitutional, though he does
indeed do that. Rather, the strangeness of this opinion lies in the
judge's relying on what a imaginary third-party (the "reasonable ob-
server") believes about the motives of the law's citizen-supporters
based on the history and common understanding of the debate over
evolution. Here, the First Amendment has been completely turned on
its head. Rather than serving as a protector of believing-citizens and a
bulwark against religious prejudice, the coercive power of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause, according to Judge Cooper, is
triggered for the purpose of limiting the political actions of religious
citizens whenever secular citizens are thought to believe (by a non-
existent "reasonable observer") that the political views of their reli-
gious neighbors are the result of a type of belief, a religious motive,
even if the law under scrutiny has a bona fide secular purpose and is
supported by secular reasons. So, in this case, the government re-
wards secular citizens for their hypothetical (though not necessarily
actual) beliefs about religious citizens (as concluded by a non-existent
"rational observer") and punishes religious citizens because of what
secular citizens are thought to perceive the religious citizens believe
(as concluded by a non-existent "rational observer"). But if govern-
ment cannot touch beliefs, as the current understanding of the First
Amendment seems to indicate, then this opinion is inconsistent with
the Constitution. For its major premise relies entirely on the beliefs of
citizens (both real and imagined) including some of these citizens' be-
liefs about other citizens' beliefs and their religious content.
Wallace v. Jaffree
5 3
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitu-
53. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38.
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tional an Alabama statute that permitted, but did not require, the fol-
lowing to take place in its public schools:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all
grades in all public schools the teacher in charge of the
room in which each class is held may announce that a period
of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be ob-
served for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any
such period no other activities shall be engaged in.-4
This portion of the code is one of three parts brought to the at-
tention of the Court. The first-which required meditation and did
not mention prayer-was not challenged by the appellees. The
third-"enacted in 1982, which authorized teachers to lead 'willing
students' in a prescribed prayer to 'Almighty God... the Creator and
Supreme Judge of the world'" 56-- had been struck down by the Court
a year earlier. 7
So the Court in this case dealt only with the statute that permit-
ted teachers to start class with a moment of silence that may include
either meditation or prayer. Unlike the third portion of the code, it
did not specifically permit teachers to lead students in a particular
prayer, but rather merely allowed teachers to set aside a minute at the
commencement of the day in which the instructor informs her stu-
54. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1984), as quoted in Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40 n.2.
55. The unchallenged provision reads:
At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the sixth
grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each
such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed one
minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any such pe-
riod silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (1984).
56. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40, quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (1984) (note omitted).
This former provision in its entirety provided:
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institu-
tion within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the
beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing students
in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following prayer to God:
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Creator
and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, and Your
peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our
government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools
in the name of our Lord. Amen.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (1984).
57. Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984).
dents that they may meditate or pray as a result of their own initia-
tive. The Court, nevertheless, struck down the statute because it vio-
lated the purpose prong of the Lemon test. And the reason for this,
the Court opines, is that the law's chief sponsor, State Senator Don-
ald Holmes, was motivated by a desire "to return voluntary prayer to
our public schools ... [I]t is a beginning and a step in the right direc-
tion." '58 Moreover, because "Senator Holmes unequivocally testified
that he had 'no other purpose in mind,"' 59 the Court concluded that
"the record not only provides us with an unambiguous affirmative an-
swer [as to the religious purpose of the statute], but it also reveals that
the enactment of [it] was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose
-indeed, the statute had no secular purpose. '
Three problems emerge from the Court's analysis, the second
and third of which are germane to this paper's thesis. First, Senator
Holmes' motives may not represent the motives of his colleagues who
voted to pass the legislation for which he was the primary sponsor.61
After all, as I noted above, legislators support bills for a variety of
motives, including a desire to get reelected, to please a particular con-
stituency, or to advance the public good. It seems to me that a plausi-
ble, though admittedly debatable, reading of Senator Holmes' com-
58. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 43. The Court quoted from a statement that Senator Holmes
inserted into the legislative record:
Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our children in
this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of this
state and this country. The United States as well as the State of Alabama was
founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort to return voluntary
prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the original position of the
writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies and beliefs hundreds of
Alabamians have urged my continuous support for permitting school prayer.
Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have worked hard on this legislation to
accomplish the return of voluntary prayer in our public schools and return to
the basic moral fiber.
Id. at 57 n. 43 (emphasis added by the Court).
59. Id. at 43 (note omitted).
60. Id. at 56.
61. Chief Justice Warren Burger says as much:
As even the appellees concede ... there is not a shred of evidence that the
legislature as a whole shared the sponsor's motive or that a majority in either
house was even aware of the sponsor's view of the bill when it was passed.
The sole relevance of the sponsor's statements, therefore, is that they reflect
the personal, subjective motives of a single legislator. No case in the 195-year
history of this Court supports the disconcerting idea that postenactment
statements by individual legislators are relevant in determining the constitu-
tionality of legislation.
Id. at 86-87 (Burger, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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ments shows that his motive was in fact not religious. It seems to me
that he was motivated by a desire to advance a notion of the public
good that he believes is connected to America's religious heritage and
its importance in the moral formation of the school-age members of
civil society. Holmes states that "by passage of this bill by the Ala-
bama Legislature our children in this state will have the opportunity
of sharing in the spiritual heritage of this state and this country. The
United States as well as the State of Alabama was founded by people
who believe in God." 62 He, apparently, sees in this a wisdom in which
the young people of his state should have the opportunity to voluntar-
ily partake: "Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have worked hard
on this legislation to accomplish the return of voluntary prayer in our
public schools and return to the basic moral fiber."63
Second, even if Senator Holmes had only a religious motive for
sponsoring this bill, it does not follow from this that the legislation it-
self may not have a secular purpose. As I pointed out above, motives
and purposes are conceptually distinct. For this reason, to employ the
concepts interchangeably, as the Court does in its reasoning in Wal-
lace, is to offer an analysis that is fundamentally flawed. After all,
even if Senator Holmes was motivated to sponsor this legislation in
order to pave the way for the eventual reinstitution of unconstitu-
tional teacher-led prayer in public schools, as the Court suggests,64 it
does not follow that the law in question in fact violates the same prin-
ciple on which the Court relied when it declared teacher-led prayer
unconstitutional. 6 That is, the law and its purpose and the reasons for
it, and not Senator Holmes' motives, are the proper object of analysis.
For one could without much difficulty both grant that Senator
Holmes' motives are purely and unambiguously religious and at the
same time construct a plausible secular purpose for this legislation
62. Id. at 57 n.43.
63. Id. (emphasis added by the Court).
64. The Court writes:
The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald Holmes, in-
serted into the legislative record-apparently without dissent-a statement
indicating that the legislation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the
public schools. Later Senator Holmes confirmed this purpose before the Dis-
trict Court. In response to the question whether he had any purpose for the
legislation other than returning voluntary prayer to public schools, he stated:
"No, I did not have no other purpose in mind."
Id. at 56-57 (notes omitted).
65. See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
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that would not be inconsistent with the language of the statute.66 For
example, because religious free exercise is part of the secular Consti-
tution, one could argue that Alabama's statute is simply informing its
public school students that they may, if they so choose, exercise this
religious freedom by engaging in voluntary prayer. As Justice Byron
White eloquently pointed out in his dissenting opinion, if more than
half of his brethren would "approve statutes that provided for a mo-
ment of silence but did not mention prayer,"6 7 then where precisely
would his brethren come down in the case of a teacher who answered
"yes" when asked by a student if she could silently pray during the
approved moment of silence?6' And if the giving of that answer by a
state actor, the teacher, is permissible, then why is it not permissible
for the Alabama legislature to provide precisely the same answer be-
fore the question is asked?69 Moreover, because earlier cases against
school-sponsored prayer may have led some citizens to mistakenly
believe that all prayer is prohibited in public schools, another purpose
of this legislation is to remedy that misconception by showing that the
state is not hostile to religious free exercise when voluntarily engaged
in by its citizens. 70
Third, and most importantly, the Court offers an extended lesson
on the freedom of conscience before it directly assesses the issue be-
fore it.71 This lesson includes a sizeable litany of quotes from prior
66. As the Court has stated:
The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy.
We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a
statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid,
our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
67. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91 (White, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Chief Justice Burger, in fact, makes this point in his dissent:
Even if an individual legislator's after-the-fact statements could rationally be
considered relevant, all of the opinions fail to mention that the sponsor also
testified that one of his purposes in drafting and sponsoring the moment-of-
silence bill was to clear up a widespread misunderstanding that a schoolchild
is legally prohibited from engaging in silent, individual prayer once he steps
inside a public school building.... That testimony is at least as important as
the statements the Court relies upon, and surely that testimony manifests a
permissible purpose.
Id. at 87 (Burger, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 48-49, which reads:
Before analyzing the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless
appropriate to recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence
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cases and important figures in American history, n some of which are
quoted above in this paper (including in footnotes). The purpose of
this portion of the Court's opinion is to scold the District Court for
it's "remarkable conclusion that the Federal Constitution imposes no
obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion., 73 The Court
concludes its lesson with these words:
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complementary components of a broader con-
cept of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's
freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his
right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the
majority. At one time it was thought that this right merely
proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over an-
other, but would not require equal respect for the con-
science of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-
Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the un-
derlying principle has been examined in the crucible of litiga-
tion, the Court has unambiguously concluded that the indi-
vidual freedom of conscience protected by the First
Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or
none at all. This conclusion derives support not only from
the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of con-
science, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs
worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary
choice by the faithful, and from recognition of the fact that
the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends be-
is the proposition that the several States have no greater power to restrain the
individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Con-
gress of the United States.
72. Id. at 48-55.
73. Id. at 48. The offending portion of the District Court opinion states:
Because the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a religion,
the prayers offered by the teachers in this case are not unconstitutional.
Therefore, the Court holds that the complaint fails to state a claim for which
relief could be granted.
Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F.Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala.
1983). The District Court's judgment was stayed by Justice Lewis F. Powell, justice for the
Eleventh Circuit. See Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 459 U.S.
1314 (1983) (in chambers). The Eleventh Circuit overturned the District Court's opinion
on appeal. See Jaffree v. Wallace 705 F.2d 1526 (1983), en banc hearing denied, 713 F.2d
614 (1983).
yond intolerance among Christian sects-or even intoler-
ance among "religions"-to encompass intolerance of the
disbeliever and the uncertain.74
What is ironic about this summary is that it is inconsistent with
the Court's religious motive analysis found elsewhere in the same
opinion. As I have already noted, motives are types of beliefs; citi-
zens, including legislators, have an ultima facie right to their beliefs
such that the state ought not reward or punish them for having these
beliefs; and a statute's purpose and the reasons for it are conceptually
distinct from the motives of the statute's supporters in both the legis-
lature and in the citizenry. Therefore, when the Court claims that a
statute or policy violates the Establishment Clause because of a legis-
lator's or a citizen's religious motives, it is in fact limiting one of the
enumerated powers of that legislator or the political rights of that
citizen solely based on the religious quality of beliefs that contribute
causally to the exercise of each individual's political powers and
rights.
Concerning citizens who hold public office, the Court's religious
motive analysis functions as a de facto religious test in violation of the
no Religious Test Clause for legislators since it limits the powers of
their office. 5 The fact that the legislators have already assumed office
does not seem to be relevant, since it seems to me that an Article VI
violation would occur if a state passed a law that forbade only Catho-
lic elected officials from voting on matters concerning human repro-
duction. Therefore, a religious test that limits a citizen's right to exer-
cise the powers of public office-whether to limit all her powers by
forbidding her to hold office or to limit some of her powers after she
holds office-is nevertheless an impermissible religious test for public
office under Article VI. Moreover, just because a court, rather than a
legislature or an executive branch, offers the test and targets a legisla-
tor's religious motive, rather than her ecclesiology or her creedal
commitments, neither makes it any less a government action nor any
less a religious test for public office.
When the religious motive analysis is applied to citizens in gen-
eral, it shows, in the words of the Supreme Court, disrespect for "the
individual's freedom of conscience 76 and "freedom of mind, 77 for it
74. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-54 (notes omitted) (emphasis added).
83. See U. S. CONST., art. VI.
76. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 53.
77. Id. at 52.
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results in a subtle coercion of, and provides an incentive to, relig-
iously-motivated citizens to publicly pretend as if they do not have
the motives they in fact have. It punishes these citizens because of
their beliefs, since their political freedom as citizens to shape their
communities is limited by a judicial prohibition of laws and policies
that happen to have proponents who are motivated exclusively by
their religious beliefs. In addition, the religious motive analysis pro-
vides sustenance to a political culture in which citizens are taught that
any public disclosure of their beliefs that serve to motivate a legisla-
tive proposal may result in the judiciary's rejection of that proposal
regardless of its content or the reasons offered for the proposal.
Conclusion
Citizens and legislators are often motivated by their religious be-
liefs to influence the institutions of government and to craft laws and
policies that affect the trajectory of their communities. Oftentimes
these policies and laws are proposed in order to remedy what these
citizens and legislators think is a wrong or an injustice, and sometimes
these laws and policies are offered to merely advance what these citi-
zens and legislators believe is the public good. In a liberal democracy,
the religious motives of these citizens and legislators should never
serve as a basis by which the courts reject as unconstitutional the laws
and policies that likely would have not been offered by these citizens
and legislators if not for their motives. Although one could construct
a good philosophical argument against this judicial practice, as some
indeed have,78 one need not do so. For, as I have argued in this paper,
the principles against the religious motive analysis are already firmly
embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence.
78. See generally Nicholas Wolterstorff's contributions to ROBERT AUDI &
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE (1997).
